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PERFECTIONISM AND MAXIMUM CONSCIOUSNESS IN 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: A TRIBUTE TO JUDGE 
BETTY B. FLETCHER 
Norman W. Spaulding* 
Abstract: What follows is a speech on the significance of Judge Betty Binns Fletcher’s 
opinions in the area of race and anti-discrimination law delivered at the University of 
Washington School of Law’s symposium, A Tribute to the Honorable Betty Binns Fletcher, 
honoring Judge Fletcher’s thirtieth year on the bench. I argue that, in an era when the 
Supreme Court has increasingly refused to recognize anti-discrimination claims, Judge 
Fletcher’s intensely fact-sensitive method of deciding such cases is as important as the results 
she has reached. Against the Supreme Court’s perfectionist jurisprudence, predicated on the 
assumption that by excising race from law, one can eliminate discrimination in society, Judge 
Fletcher has developed a jurisprudence of maximum consciousness, predicated on the 
assumption that judicial officers are obliged by the Fourteenth Amendment and our history to 
remain acutely aware of the risk of slippage between seemingly rational, neutral social action 
and irrational stereotype, cognitive bias, and animus.  
I am honored to have the invitation to speak about Judge Betty 
Fletcher. I should say up front that I am not an empiricist. My method of 
reflecting on the Judge’s decisions on race and the law is the fruit of an 
impressionistic doctrinal survey, supplemented by something like 
reverse autobiographical free association. I am not an anti-discrimination 
expert either, though I have followed some of the doctrine in this area 
with interest. It is also possible and perhaps more honest to say that anti-
discrimination law brought me to law school, though not in any 
conventional sense. I have not told this story to the Judge before, but I 
am prompted by reading her cases on race to share it now. 
My parents are mixed. My mother is lily white, grew up in a small 
New England town. My father is black, grew up on the South Side of 
Chicago. Spauldings, black Spauldings, have always been mixed. 
Family records go back to North Carolina in the early 1800s and a series 
of interracial encounters: between a white plantation owner and his 
slave, the Indian woman the slave married, and the son of the plantation 
owner who freed the slave by formal court petition in 1825. The slave, 
                                                     
* Nelson Bowman Sweitzer & Marie B. Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, and law 
clerk to Judge Betty B. Fletcher, 1999–2000. I would like to thank Trevor Morisson for the 
invitation to give this speech, Samantha Bateman and Caroline Jackson for excellent assistance with 
research, and the editors of the University of Washington Law Review for agreeing to and assisting 
in its publication. 
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Benjamin Spaulding, was born in Duplin County in 1773. Deed records 
show him owning property as early as 1817, and the 1820 census lists 
him as a “free man of color,” so the later court petition merely may have 
recognized a prior understanding between master and slave.1 Benjamin 
Spaulding and his wife Edith had ten children, and those children 
eventually married Indians, whites, and other blacks.2 
So, a complicated history of miscegenation was in place long before 
my parents met in college and decided to marry. Still their choice was 
not easy. They married within a year of the Supreme Court decision in 
Loving v. Virginia.3 My mother’s family initially disowned her, and it 
took years before many of them could even so much as meet my father’s 
eye. My parents told me about Loving, and I remember feeling 
dumbstruck by the idea that a law of any kind might have prevented my 
parents’ marriage if they had lived in the wrong state. Even though the 
decision struck down anti-miscegenation laws, the thought of it—of such 
laws and of the need for judicial intervention in something so intimate, 
so idiosyncratic, so private—provoked a kind of vertiginous feeling I 
can now identify as bordering on the existential. The proximity between 
law and my being, my parents’ well-being, was revealed in a way that 
made my identity seem more fragile and contingent than I think any 
child’s should. 
If I had not already, at that moment, resolved to be a lawyer, to master 
the thing that seemed then so opaque and powerful, meeting my father’s 
friend, a black lawyer from Los Angeles who in the 1970s was working 
entertainment deals with black musicians, sealed the deal. I have long 
since lost the pre-release Stevie Wonder LP of Hotter Than July he gave 
me for my ninth birthday, but the idea that law could offer access both to 
the Constitution and racial equality on the one hand, and to Stevie 
Wonder on the other, was too much to resist. My father’s friend was a 
Porsche-driving Thurgood Marshall in my imagination, and the poorer 
my family became, the more being a lawyer came to symbolize the 
ultimate professional endeavor—justice, Rhythm & Blues, and a good 
salary. 
Those of you old enough to remember the Hotter Than July album 
will perhaps understand how I conjured this fantastic mélange of social 
justice and Motown professionalism. The song “Happy Birthday” on the 
album was dedicated to Martin Luther King, Jr., and the sleeve liner 
                                                     
1. LOUIS D. MITCHELL & JOHN A. SPAULDING, A STORY OF THE DESCENDANTS OF BENJAMIN 
SPAULDING (1773–1862) WITH GENEALOGY 29 (1989). 
2. Id. at 30. 
3. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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featured a large photograph of Dr. King with text below making an 
impassioned plea to make January 15th a national holiday in recognition 
of “what he achieved and as a reminder of the distance which still has to 
be traveled.”4 On the back of the sleeve liner was a collage of 
photographs depicting bloody moments in the civil rights movement. In 
the center is a shot of Dr. King walking, head up, leading a throng of 
marchers. In my mind at the time, he seemed to be walking toward the 
law, and it seemed that the vindication of his claims in the law would 
draw the country out of the racial terror and chaos visible in the 
surrounding shots. 
I say all of this because, having been asked to talk about Judge 
Fletcher’s influence in the area of race and the law, and in sitting down 
to read her opinions stretching back thirty years, I have been struck anew 
by the tension between what I then saw as the promise of civil rights 
law, and what it has become. I was not naïve about the promise of law. 
Loving taught me not that anti-miscegenation laws were 
unconstitutional, but that they had been perfectly legal for three hundred 
years of our history. Seeing my mother and father arrested on false 
charges when our white landlord called the sheriff because my father 
had the audacity to refuse to pay rent on grounds of the implied warranty 
of habitability had already revealed the double-jointedness of formally 
neutral legal rights and procedures, had already shown me how 
discriminatory practices move in, through, and beyond legal categories 
to find expression in and reinforce entrenched social norms. 
But there was a real promise in the momentum depicted at the center 
of the collage on the back of the sleeve liner, a sense that law could 
vindicate justice, not just stand in the way. To identify law with the 
photograph of King marching, as I did, rather than with the helmeted 
white cops in the surrounding scenes of riot and bloodied black bodies, 
was a promise in itself. The most ambitious term of the promise was that 
in a constitutional democracy that rather embarrassingly came to have to 
formally guarantee equal protection of the laws, the institutions of law 
could work to make that guarantee something more than a glittering 
constitutional generality. 
The appointment of Judge Fletcher to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was a manifestation of this promise, but we all know what 
happened with anti-discrimination law in the Supreme Court in the 
decades following. 
In the area of school desegregation, the Court moved from conferring 
                                                     
4. STEVIE WONDER, HOTTER THAN JULY, Liner Notes (Motown Records 1980). 
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generous discretion on lower courts to enter effective remedial decrees 
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education5 in 1971 to a 
series of more restrictive standards in Milliken v. Bradley I6 and II7 in the 
mid-1970s and the Missouri v. Jenkins cases8 in 1990 and 1995, and 
finally to striking down even voluntary desegregation decrees in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District9 in 2007. 
In the area of affirmative action, the fairly narrow windows opened by 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke10 in 1978 and Fullilove 
v. Klutznick11 in 1980 were closed in a series of decisions, most 
prominently Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education12 in 1986, Richmond 
v. Croson13 in 1989, and Adarand Constructors v. Pena14 in 1995, in 
                                                     
5. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (finding mathematical ratios of white to black students, grouping of non-
contiguous school zones, and court-ordered busing to be appropriate measures falling within the 
district courts’ broad remedial powers “to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation”). 
6. 418 U.S. 717, 744–47 (1974) (holding that busing and other remedies could extend across 
district lines only where there was actual evidence that multiple school districts had deliberately 
engaged in a policy of segregation). 
7. 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (approving a remedial plan going beyond pupil assignments because 
the plan was “tailored” to cure the constitutional violation—Detroit’s de jure segregated school 
system—and therefore did not exceed the violation). 
8. 515 U.S. 70, 90, 93 (1995) (interpreting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to 
deal only with de jure segregation, and striking down an order that aimed to correct de facto racial 
inequality on the grounds that the lower courts had used improper guidelines to justify broad relief); 
495 U.S. 33, 56–58 (1990) (holding that a district court had abused its discretion by imposing a 
property tax increase in order to enhance the quality of local schools and thereby attract white 
students from the suburbs). 
9. 551 U.S. 701, 710–11, 747–48 (2007) (prohibiting the assignment of students to public schools 
based upon racial classifications, even where the school district voluntarily adopted the plan in an 
effort to achieve racial diversity); id. at 730–31 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) (refusing to recognize 
racial balance as a compelling state interest). 
10. 438 U.S. 265, 315–19 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (concluding that the use of rigid quota 
systems in college admissions is impermissible, but upholding the constitutionality of affirmative 
action programs that use race as a plus factor). 
11. 448 U.S. 448, 482–92 (1980) (concluding that Congress need not act in a completely 
colorblind manner when exercising its Spending Clause powers to remedy racial discrimination, and 
upholding a 10% set-aside program for minority business enterprises as a constitutional exercise of 
congressional authority). 
12. 476 U.S. 267, 279–84 (1986) (striking down a provision in a teachers’ union collective 
bargaining agreement that protected less-senior minorities from layoffs as violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
13. 488 U.S. 469, 477–486, 498 (1989) (finding a “generalized assertion that there has been past 
discrimination in an entire industry” to be an insufficient basis for remedial action, and holding 
Richmond’s minority set-aside program, which reserved 30% of the city’s construction contracts for 
minority business enterprises, unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); cf. Metro Broad., 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990) (upholding, by a vote of 5–4, FCC policies giving preference 
to minorities in the awarding of licenses and providing for “distress sales” to minority buyers 
 
Spaulding DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:19 PM 
2010] PERFECTIONISM AND MAXIMUM CONSCIOUSNESS 37 
 
which the Court insisted that even benign and remedial reliance on race 
would be subjected to “the strictest judicial scrutiny.”15 
In the area of Title VII and other litigation involving statutory civil 
rights, the Court has eviscerated the continuing violation doctrine, 
rigidly enforced statutes of limitation, and constrained remedies.16 Even 
when Congress has used its enforcement powers under the 
Reconstruction Amendments to expand statutory remedies for unequal 
treatment, the Supreme Court has revived a robust antebellum federalism 
doctrine as a limiting principle.17 
In most of these areas, the case names alone resonate without 
extended parenthetical elaboration. Reading Judge Fletcher’s anti-
discrimination cases against the Supreme Court’s retreat from the 
                                                     
without FCC review because Congress has a legitimate interest in diversity in broadcasting and the 
programs were narrowly tailored). 
14. 515 U.S. 200, 224–27, 239 (1995) (holding that all racial classifications, including those 
imposed by the federal government, are subject to strict scrutiny and that current disadvantage may 
not be presumed based merely upon race or proof of past discrimination, remanding for review 
under this standard a challenge to a financial incentive program in federal contracts for contractors 
who hired minority subcontractors). 
15. Id.; cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying a version of strict scrutiny to 
affirmative action programs at colleges and universities); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) 
(same). 
16. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628–29 (2007) (barring a 
female employee’s employment discrimination suit because it was not filed within the 180-day 
statute of limitations period for Title VII claims); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 
101, 113 (2002) (limiting the continuing violation doctrine by holding that “discrete discriminatory 
acts are not actionable if time-barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed 
charges”); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002) (holding that 
undocumented alien employees may not receive back pay as a remedy for their employers’ 
violations of the National Labor Relations Act). 
17. See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that sovereign immunity 
principles inherent in the Eleventh Amendment protect state defendants against suit under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625–27 (2000) (striking 
down the Violence Against Women Act as an unconstitutional use of Congress’s remedial powers 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the Act was not a congruent and 
proportional remedy to gender-based discrimination by the states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 82–91 (2000) (concluding that Congress cannot constitutionally abrogate state 
sovereign immunity to enforce rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because age 
is not a suspect classification); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 643–47 (1999) (invalidating Congress’s attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
under the Patent Act because Congress had failed to identify a pattern of pervasive, unremedied 
constitutional violations); cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516–34 (2004) (permitting 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Americans with Disabilities Act in limited 
circumstances where the fundamental right of access to the courts was involved and there was a 
sufficient record of the denial of that fundamental right to disabled individuals); Nev. Dep’t of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–35 (2003) (allowing abrogation of sovereign immunity 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act because gender-based discrimination receives heightened 
scrutiny and the record established a history of such discrimination). 
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promise of the second reconstruction, two things become very clear. 
First, Judge Fletcher evinces a very different understanding of what that 
promise was and what it called upon the judiciary to do. Second, despite 
the Supreme Court’s retreat through the hypocrisy of “strict” scrutiny, 
she has steadfastly insisted upon exercising meaningful judicial review 
in anti-discrimination cases. The methodology of her analysis reflects 
the highest standards of judicial integrity, independence, and fidelity to 
the principle of due process. More importantly, it reflects one of the 
animating principles of the second reconstruction—that law can be made 
proprioceptive, by which I mean made aware of and responsive to its 
own movement in, and influence on, social action. 
First, with respect to the different understandings of what the second 
reconstruction calls upon judges to do, I want to borrow a criticism 
Ralph Ellison offers in a book review he wrote in 1945 of an anthology 
of essays on race provocatively entitled Primer for White Folks.18 
Ellison notes his disappointment that notwithstanding the sympathetic 
attitude of many of the contributors regarding the problem of racism, 
their normative stance avoids the threshold challenge racism presents to 
our democratic legitimacy. The authors appear to fear genuine equality, 
to want to believe that it already exists, or to displace responsibility for 
bringing it about. As Ellison puts it: 
Since hardly any aspect of our culture escapes the blight of 
hypocrisy implicit in our social institutions, it is not surprising 
that many of the pieces mix appeal for fair play with double-
talk; or that most are much too fearful of that absolute concept 
“democracy,” circling above it like planes being forced to earth 
in a fog. They seem concerned most often with patching up the 
merry-go-round-that-broke-down than with the projection of that 
oh-so-urgently-needed new American humanism.19 
Patching up the merry-go-round that broke down. The metaphor 
perfectly captures the position of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts on 
race. The Court has been much more concerned with patching up neutral 
constitutional principles, repairing the formal system of the Framers, and 
protecting private and social institutions from judicial intervention, than 
in practically securing the guarantee of equality. It has understood the 
second reconstruction as a mandate to undo discrimination, but by way 
of a foundational assumption that racism is an exceptional and 
                                                     
18. RALPH ELLISON, Beating That Boy, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH ELLISON 145 
(1995). 
19. Id. at 147. 
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historically aberrant social practice readily overcome by eliminating race 
as a legal category. In a word, it is a jurisprudence of perfectionism. 
But if the basic promise of the second reconstruction is to humanize 
the law of equality, to draw it away not only from state-sanctioned 
subordination but also private subordination under the color of law, it 
surely calls for a different kind of judicial review. Ellison was not 
concerned with judicial review, but he was deeply concerned with the 
kind of historical, moral, and practical consciousness that could move 
the nation in a more democratic, by which he meant, at least in part, 
more egalitarian, direction. And he believed that people of all colors 
would have to make this shift in consciousness animated by a new 
humanism. In another essay, one of his most elegant and provocative, he 
describes the effect of this shift as a kind of “maximum 
consciousness.”20 
Maximum consciousness is a provocative term. Ellison uses it to 
reveal one of the effects of comedy, quoting Kenneth Burke’s 
observation that comedy can “enable us to be observers of ourselves 
while acting. Its ultimate end would not be passiveness but maximum 
consciousness. [It should allow] one to ‘transcend’ himself by noting his 
own foibles . . . [and should] provide a rationale for locating the 
irrational and the non-rational.”21 To this, Ellison, acutely aware of the 
reversals in understanding of oneself and others that comedy makes 
possible, adds, “[t]he greater the stress within society the stronger the 
comic antidote required.”22 
Judge Fletcher’s anti-discrimination decisions display the operation of 
a kind of maximum consciousness. The method, if I may generalize, has 
three key features: 1) a presumption that neither status nor circumstance 
creates any immunity from anti-discrimination law; 2) an acute 
awareness of social context, particularly the ubiquitous risk of slippage 
between seemingly rational, neutral social action and irrational 
stereotype or cognitive bias; and 3) exhaustive attention to factual 
nuance. 
From one of the Judge’s earliest opinions, a 1981 case holding that 
black enlisted navy officers have a right under Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents23 to judicial review of racial discrimination in duty 
                                                     
20. RALPH ELLISON, An Extravagance of Laughter, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF RALPH 
ELLISON, supra note 18, at 613, 647. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. It is no accident that the essay from which this quote is drawn explores the place of 
comedy in race relations. 
23. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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assignments,24 to a case decided shortly after the 9/11 attacks in which 
she upheld the right of a Lebanese school teacher to challenge her 
suspension for false allegations that she made a bomb threat,25 the Judge 
has been adamant that, with narrow exceptions, no social role is too 
privileged and no emergency too dire to warrant immunity from 
constitutional and statutory anti-discrimination guarantees. Judge 
Fletcher was reversed in the navy officers’ case two years later, but the 
Supreme Court had to duck inconvenient nineteenth-century case law in 
order to conclude that superior military officers have a constitutionally 
unique status.26 
The Judge’s acute sensitivity to social context and the risk of 
cognitive bias works in and through her attention to factual nuance. In 
opinion after opinion, one sees painstaking, elaborately detailed review 
of the record below. In the process, overt but overlooked or subtle biases 
in the defendant employer’s decision making, or in the defendant public 
institution’s policies, come sharply into relief. More than that, 
unconscious biases and missteps in trial court decisions under review are 
revealed. And one suspects that the Judge’s scrupulous attention to 
context and factual nuance has the effect of checking even her own 
presuppositions and the assumptions of her colleagues in conference. 
Some of the most striking anti-discrimination cases the Judge has 
decided involve the reversal of summary judgment or judgment as a 
matter of law for defendants in Title VII cases. An apparently 
compelling and legitimate non-discriminatory business reason suddenly 
evaporates when a fact ignored or improperly dismissed by the trial 
court is carefully extracted from the record to establish pretext. As the 
Judge delicately admonished in a 1989 retaliation case: 
As a summary procedure, a directed verdict should be used 
judiciously, particularly in cases involving issues of motivation 
or intent. An employee’s claim of retaliatory discharge requires 
a determination of an employer’s true motivation, an elusive 
factual question which is difficult to ascertain and generally 
                                                     
24. Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 730 n.1, 736 (9th Cir. 1981). 
25. Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003). 
26. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 n.2 (1983) (purporting to distinguish an 1851 
case, Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. 89 (1851), in which the Supreme Court upheld a common law 
cause of action by a marine against his commanding officer for damages suffered as a result of 
punishment and illegal detention on board after the expiration of his term of enlistment). Judge 
Fletcher later maintained that the Court had not fully reversed course in Chappell. See Gonzalez v. 
Dep’t of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Implicit in the court’s order of remand is the 
recognition that, in some situations at least, uniformed members of the Armed Services may assert 
that their constitutional and statutory rights have been violated by their superiors.”). 
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unsuitable for summary disposition.27 
This was a “delicate” admonition because in the preceding three-and-
a-half pages, the Judge offered a comprehensive reconstruction of 
evidence indicating that the two black plaintiffs had been laid off within 
weeks of filing EEOC discrimination charges by the very same company 
officers whose actions had prompted the EEOC complaints, and that the 
employees had been laid off on economic grounds when they had quite 
heavy workloads while other employees were transferred in order to 
avoid layoffs.28 Her opinion also takes four pages to individually review 
and overturn the district court’s erroneous exclusion of relevant 
evidence.29 
In an era of appellate adjudication in which overloaded dockets have 
inspired a new level of judicial imperialism and deference to managerial 
district court judges,30 it is refreshingly retro-chic to see skepticism 
about the legitimacy of pre-verdict disposition in factually controverted 
cases. The point is not that all the plaintiffs were entitled to prevail, and I 
don’t take that to have been the Judge’s point either. What is significant 
is her disposition with respect to uncertainty, particularly uncertainty 
regarding a social problem precious few are capable of admitting we still 
have. Like Ellison, the Judge understands that we cannot locate the 
irrational and the non-rational if we don’t bother to look. 
Too few appellate judges order and review the entire record below for 
each case they hear on appeal. But this simple practice, to which the 
Judge religiously adheres, operates to forestall the seemingly irresistible 
and ubiquitous temptation to conclude that racial motive is absent, to 
believe that good intentions cannot be mixed with bad, to believe, in 
short, the perfectionist thesis that we have overcome, or are on the verge 
of overcoming, racial subordination.31 Maximum consciousness. 
                                                     
27. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted). 
28. Id. at 503–06. 
29. Id. at 511–15. In a 2002 case reversing summary judgment for the employer, she carefully 
reviewed the record to show that the plaintiffs could not legitimately have been denied promotions 
on the ground that they were not qualified when the employer had, over a period of years, 
systematically excluded them from work details that would have given them the necessary training 
and skills for the positions they were denied. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
30. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–53 (2009) (following the new 
pleading standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and dismissing as implausible claims of 
supervisory liability against government officers who allegedly designed a policy of targeting Arab 
and Muslim men for detention and harsh treatment after the attacks of September 11, 2001); Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560–64 (2007) (rejecting the notice pleading standard of 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), and adopting a new “plausibility” standard). 
31. Or, as Justice O’Connor has suggested, that we shall have overcome it in twenty-five years. 
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There is a deep humanism in the Judge’s method of maximum 
consciousness as well. One could give many examples, for there are 
many cases insightfully construing civil rights laws, and they are 
regularly cited in other courts around the country.32 But the example I’d 
like to give in closing is one I suppose most of us would consider an 
unremarkable case. 
Clement Sumner was a black postal worker fired for 
insubordination.33 The trial court entered a defense verdict after a five- 
                                                     
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of 
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”). 
32. There are a number of examples in the area of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006) (citing Raad v. Fairbanks N. Starborough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 
1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (B. Fletcher, J.) (holding that discrimination in hiring can be found on 
the basis of qualifications alone when the complaining applicant’s qualifications are “clearly 
superior” to those of the selected job applicant—a more lenient standard than in some other 
circuits)); Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3d 326, 335 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing and following U.S. v. 
Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (B. Fletcher, J.) (holding that, when alleging 
discrimination in jury selection, “the fair cross-section claim does not require a showing that the 
selection procedure is susceptible of abuse or not race-neutral; the defendant must only show that 
the exclusion of his or her group is ‘systematic’”)); Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 
2003) (citing and following B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t., 276 F.3d 1091, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (B. 
Fletcher, J.) (authorizing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 contingent upon a finding of 
recklessness or bad faith; allowing plaintiffs more leniency in pleading requirements for 
discrimination claims, as “[c]omplainants filing discrimination charges are acting as laypersons and 
should not be held to the higher standard of legal pleading by which [a court] would review a civil 
complaint”)); O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing and 
relying upon Pavon v. Swift, 192 F.3d 902, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1999) (B. Fletcher, J.) (holding that 
compensatory damages awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are not subject to the statutory cap 
contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3))). 
In the area of anti-discrimination law more generally, Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 
2000) (B. Fletcher, J.), adopted the EEOC’s definition of an “adverse employment action” under 
Title VII—that is, that such action need not constitute an ultimate employment action, but may 
instead constitute “any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably 
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity,” with the severity of 
the retaliatory action determining damages and not liability. 217 F.3d at 1242–43. Several courts 
have cited and relied upon Henderson. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 
53, 61 (2006); Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 2006); Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 
1211, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 89 (1st Cir. 2005); White v. 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d 789, 809 (6th Cir. 2004) (Clay, J., concurring); Gregory v. 
Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 701 (2d Cir. 2001); Thomas v. Ragland, 324 F. Supp. 2d 950, 975 (W.D. Wis. 
2004); Johnson v. Milwaukee Sch. of Eng’g, 258 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906 (E.D. Wis. 2003); Gonsalves 
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 58 P.3d 1196, 1209 (Haw. 2002); Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, 
Ltd., 32 P.3d 52, 69 (Haw. 2001); Estate of Harris v. Papa John’s Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 679 
(Iowa 2004); Madeja v. MPB Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1044 (N.H. 2003). Another example in this 
area is Yamaguchi v. U.S. Department of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (B. Fletcher, 
J.), which held that employers are liable for employees’ harassing behavior if they know the conduct 
is taking place and fail to take adequate remedial measures to address it. Yamaguchi was cited with 
approval in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998). 
33. Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1990) (B. Fletcher, J., sitting by 
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day bench trial, stating that Sumner’s race discrimination claims were 
“conclusory and generalized” and that he had failed to substantiate his 
claim of retaliation.34 The case tracks an all-too-common workplace 
pattern. Sumner is regularly given disproportionate sanctions for minor 
infractions on the job. When he begins to complain, and to identify 
preferential treatment given to white co-workers, inflated write-ups 
escalate to suspensions. With a disciplinary record in place, one of his 
former supervisors confronts Sumner over a trumped-up safety violation. 
Sumner walks away, but is re-confronted, accused of insubordination, 
and then fired.35 
The evidence at trial showed that flagrant insubordination by white 
employees was regularly overlooked, that the former supervisor accused 
Sumner of having a “war-like attitude” but could only give as evidence 
the fact that Sumner had complained about racial discrimination in the 
distribution of assignments.36 Combined with the disputed safety 
violation that might have been enough to reverse, but the Judge looked 
even deeper, uncovering direct evidence of discrimination in the 
testimony of another supervisor at the initial EEOC hearing. The 
supervisor conceded that his boss “didn’t care for . . . Black, Hispanic, 
and Latin background people.”37 
Judge Fletcher reversed the judgment in the Sumner case, but what 
strikes me about the opinion is less the result itself than the effect of the 
careful narrative rendering of the workplace conflict. Sumner is freed 
from the stereotype of the angry black employee, and seen instead as an 
employee struggling to preserve his dignity in a racially charged 
environment. When read against the context of the inflated prior write-
ups, the moment of confrontation between Sumner and his former 
supervisor shifts from insubordination to a kind of set-up toward which 
the supervisor, wittingly or not, had been steering Sumner for months. 
Sumner saw the set-up and tried to avoid it, but he was still fired. 
This moment is one of the most basic and insidious aspects of racial 
subordination, the moment when it becomes clear that any course of 
action will be arbitrarily punished. The moment is crushing, an open 
                                                     
designation). 
34. Sumner v. Postmaster Gen., No. 86 CIV. 9301(KC), 1989 WL 66674, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 
15, 1989). 
35. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 205–08. 
36. Id. at 210. 
37. Id. at 211. The same move of unearthing ignored facts appears throughout her 1984 decision 
reversing the district court’s refusal to order desegregation of the San Jose School District, in Diaz 
v. San Jose Unified School District, 733 F.2d 660 (1984). 
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invitation to despair, to anomie. The Judge not only sees it, sees that the 
district court missed it entirely, she represents that moment in a detail 
that reverses the logic of subordination by reversing the perspective that 
systematically renders these moments invisible. Maximum 
consciousness. 
To reconstruct the plaintiff’s experience from the record in this way is 
itself humanizing, drawing a counter-narrative to the disgruntled 
troublemaker the district court too quickly assumed was before it, 
demonstrating that the counter-narrative is in fact the dominant, if not 
uncontested, narrative located in the record evidence. This method is 
Ellison’s new humanism in action: humble, inquisitive, constitutively 
attentive to the fallibility of all human endeavors, and most importantly, 
off the merry-go-round of racial perfectionism. The effect is to turn the 
law toward democracy, toward equal dignity, not just equal rights—in 
short, toward the vindication of promises we have already made. 
Thank you, Judge Fletcher. Thank you for being so careful with these 
cases. Thank you for bringing maximum consciousness to the law. And 
warmest congratulations on thirty years on the bench. I could not be 
more honored to have served as your clerk. 
 
